Publications:
1. "Targeted Information and Limited Attention," with Andreas Hefti, RAND Journal of Economics, conditionally accepted.
2. "Voting with Public Information," Games and Economic Behavior, 113, pp. 694-719, 2019.
3. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities,"
with Alexey Kushnir, Economic Theory, 67, pp. 617-644, 2019.
1. "Targeted Information and Limited Attention," with Andreas Hefti, RAND Journal of Economics, conditionally accepted.
2. "Voting with Public Information," Games and Economic Behavior, 113, pp. 694-719, 2019.
3. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities,"
with Alexey Kushnir, Economic Theory, 67, pp. 617-644, 2019.
Working Papers:
1. "Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets," with Dimitri Migrow, September 2019.
Abstract: Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is complemented by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.
2. "Delegating Performance Evaluation," with Igor Letina and Nick Netzer, November 2018, R&R at Theoretical Economics.
Abstract: We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer’s potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid.
3. "Confusion, Indecisiveness and Polarization," with Andreas Hefti and Armin Schmutzler, January 2019.
Abstract: Do firms seek to make a market transparent or do they want to manipulate the perception of product characteristics? Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, obfuscation is not necessarily an equilibrium phenomenon in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms seek to educate consumers. However, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion is beneficial for firms and obfuscation an equilibrium strategy. The adverse welfare consequences of obfuscation are more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also buy the wrong product. Our model can also be adapted to offer new insights on the incentives for political candidates to induce polarized opinions by confusing voters.
4. "Monotone Equilibria in Signalling Games," with Harry Di Pei, April 2018.
Abstract: We study the monotonicity of sender’s equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signalling games. We use counterexamples to show that when the sender’s payoff is non-separable, the Spence-Mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which the sender uses non-monotone strategies. These equilibria can survive standard refinements as incentives are strict and the sender plays every action with positive probability. We provide sufficient conditions under which the sender’s strategy is monotone in every Nash equilibrium. Our conditions require the sender’s payoff to have strictly increasing differences between the state and the action profile and to be monotone with respect to each player’s action. We also identify and fully characterize a novel property on the sender’s payoff that we call increasing absolute differences over distributions, under which every pair of distributions over the receiver’s actions can be ranked endogenously. Our sufficient conditions fit into a number of applications, including advertising, warranty provision, education and job assignment.
5. "On Linear Transformations of Intersections," with Alexey Kushnir, September 2017.
Abstract: For any linear transformation and two convex closed sets, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when the transformation of the intersection of the sets coincides with the intersection of their images. We also identify analogous conditions for non-convex sets, general transformations, and multiple sets. We demonstrate the usefulness of our results via an application to the economics literature of mechanism design.
1. "Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets," with Dimitri Migrow, September 2019.
Abstract: Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is complemented by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.
2. "Delegating Performance Evaluation," with Igor Letina and Nick Netzer, November 2018, R&R at Theoretical Economics.
Abstract: We study optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents when performance evaluation is delegated to a reviewer. The reviewer may be biased in favor of the agents, but the degree of bias is unknown to the principal. We show that a contest, which is a contract in which the principal determines a set of prizes to be allocated to the agents, is optimal. By using a contest, the principal can commit to sustaining incentives despite the reviewer’s potential leniency bias. The optimal effort profile can be uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with a cap. Our analysis has implications for applications as diverse as the design of worker compensation, the awarding of research grants, and the allocation of foreign aid.
3. "Confusion, Indecisiveness and Polarization," with Andreas Hefti and Armin Schmutzler, January 2019.
Abstract: Do firms seek to make a market transparent or do they want to manipulate the perception of product characteristics? Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, obfuscation is not necessarily an equilibrium phenomenon in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms seek to educate consumers. However, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion is beneficial for firms and obfuscation an equilibrium strategy. The adverse welfare consequences of obfuscation are more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also buy the wrong product. Our model can also be adapted to offer new insights on the incentives for political candidates to induce polarized opinions by confusing voters.
4. "Monotone Equilibria in Signalling Games," with Harry Di Pei, April 2018.
Abstract: We study the monotonicity of sender’s equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signalling games. We use counterexamples to show that when the sender’s payoff is non-separable, the Spence-Mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which the sender uses non-monotone strategies. These equilibria can survive standard refinements as incentives are strict and the sender plays every action with positive probability. We provide sufficient conditions under which the sender’s strategy is monotone in every Nash equilibrium. Our conditions require the sender’s payoff to have strictly increasing differences between the state and the action profile and to be monotone with respect to each player’s action. We also identify and fully characterize a novel property on the sender’s payoff that we call increasing absolute differences over distributions, under which every pair of distributions over the receiver’s actions can be ranked endogenously. Our sufficient conditions fit into a number of applications, including advertising, warranty provision, education and job assignment.
5. "On Linear Transformations of Intersections," with Alexey Kushnir, September 2017.
Abstract: For any linear transformation and two convex closed sets, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when the transformation of the intersection of the sets coincides with the intersection of their images. We also identify analogous conditions for non-convex sets, general transformations, and multiple sets. We demonstrate the usefulness of our results via an application to the economics literature of mechanism design.
Research Notes:
1. "A Note on Jackson and Yariv (2017)," October 2017.
Abstract: In this short note, I provide a generalization of the main results of Jackson and Yariv (2017) on the (non-)existence of representative agents.
2. "A Note on Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (2009)," with Alexey Kushnir, April 2014.
Abstract: Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (2009) provide two simplified and insightful proofs for the celebrated Roberts' Theorem (Roberts, 1979). In this short note, we correct a mistake in their first proof.
1. "A Note on Jackson and Yariv (2017)," October 2017.
Abstract: In this short note, I provide a generalization of the main results of Jackson and Yariv (2017) on the (non-)existence of representative agents.
2. "A Note on Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (2009)," with Alexey Kushnir, April 2014.
Abstract: Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (2009) provide two simplified and insightful proofs for the celebrated Roberts' Theorem (Roberts, 1979). In this short note, we correct a mistake in their first proof.
