Publications:
1. "Happy Times: Measuring Happiness Using Response Times," with Nick Netzer, American Economic Review 113 (2023), 3289-3322.
2. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," with Igor Letina and Nick Netzer, Journal of Economic Theory 213 (2023), 105616.
3. "When Does Centralization Undermine Adaptation?," with Dimitri Migrow, Journal of Economic Theory 205 (2022), 105533.
4. "Preferences, Confusion and Competition," with Andreas Hefti and Armin Schmutzler, Economic Journal 132 (2022), 1852-1881.
5. "Monotone Equilibria in Signalling Games," with Harry Pei, European Economic Review 124 (2020), 103408.
6. "Delegating Performance Evaluation," with Igor Letina and Nick Netzer, Theoretical Economics 15 (2020), 477-509.
7. "Targeted Information and Limited Attention," with Andreas Hefti, RAND Journal of Economics 51 (2020), 402-420.
8. "On Linear Transformations of Intersections," with Alexey Kushnir, Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 28 (2020), 475-489.
9. "Voting with Public Information," Games and Economic Behavior 113 (2019), 694-719.
10. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities,"
with Alexey Kushnir, Economic Theory 67 (2019), 617-644.
Working Papers:
1. "Talent Poaching and Job Rotation," with Diego Battiston and Miguel Espinosa, August 2023.
- Revise & Resubmit at the Management Science.
Abstract: The value of a firm's service lies both in its workers and its relationship with clients. In this paper, we study the interaction between client-specific experience accumulated by workers, poaching behaviour from clients and strategic rotation of workers by firms. Using detailed personnel data from a security-service firm, we show that an increase in client-specific experience increases both the productivity of workers and their probability of being poached. The firm reacts to this risk by rotating workers across multiple clients, and more frequently so to those workers more likely to be poached. We show that after a policy change that prohibited talent poaching, the firm sharply decreased the frequency of rotation which in turn increased workers' productivity. We propose a theoretical model that guides the empirical patterns and allows us to argue their external validity beyond our specific empirical setting.
2. "Startup Acquisitions: Acquihires and Talent Hoarding," with Jean-Michel Benkert and Igor Letina, October 2023.
Abstract: We study how competitive forces may drive firms to inefficiently acquire startup talent. In our model, two rival firms have the capacity to acquihire and integrate a startup operating in a possibly orthogonal market. We show that firms may pursue such "acquihires" as a preemptive strategy, even when these transactions appear unprofitable in isolation. Thus, acquihires, even absent traditional competition-reducing effects, need not be benign as they can lead to inefficient talent allocation. Additionally, our analysis underscores that such talent hoarding can diminish consumer surplus and exacerbate job volatility for acquihired employees.
3. "Image-Building Persuasion," with Carl Heese, October 2023.
Abstract: In many economic situations, a sender communicates strategically with a receiver not only to influence the latter's decision-making but also to influence how certain unobserved characteristics of herself (e.g. loyalty, integrity, or smartness) are perceived. To study such strategic interactions, we introduce image-building motives into the canonical framework of Bayesian persuasion. We characterize how the sender optimally sacrifices her persuasive influence on the receiver's decision to boost her reputation, by manipulating the communication protocol about a payoff-relevant state. Whether the receiver fares better or worse compared to the pure persuasion setting may depend on the selected equilibrium, and effects can be non-monotone with respect to the sender's characteristics. We illustrate our findings within various classic payoff environments, for instance with quadratic losses or state-independent sender preferences. Finally, we use the model to shed new light on a wider range of applications.
中文期刊发表 (Publications in Chinese):
1. "有限理性下的集体合作：理论与应用," 与胡涛合作, 《经济学 (季刊) 》，2023年第23卷第6期，2213-2230页。
2. "相关性误判与策略性信息混淆," 与沈吉、王禛阳合作, 《经济管理学刊》，录用待刊。
1. "Happy Times: Measuring Happiness Using Response Times," with Nick Netzer, American Economic Review 113 (2023), 3289-3322.
2. "Optimal Contest Design: Tuning the Heat," with Igor Letina and Nick Netzer, Journal of Economic Theory 213 (2023), 105616.
3. "When Does Centralization Undermine Adaptation?," with Dimitri Migrow, Journal of Economic Theory 205 (2022), 105533.
4. "Preferences, Confusion and Competition," with Andreas Hefti and Armin Schmutzler, Economic Journal 132 (2022), 1852-1881.
5. "Monotone Equilibria in Signalling Games," with Harry Pei, European Economic Review 124 (2020), 103408.
6. "Delegating Performance Evaluation," with Igor Letina and Nick Netzer, Theoretical Economics 15 (2020), 477-509.
7. "Targeted Information and Limited Attention," with Andreas Hefti, RAND Journal of Economics 51 (2020), 402-420.
8. "On Linear Transformations of Intersections," with Alexey Kushnir, Set-Valued and Variational Analysis 28 (2020), 475-489.
9. "Voting with Public Information," Games and Economic Behavior 113 (2019), 694-719.
10. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities,"
with Alexey Kushnir, Economic Theory 67 (2019), 617-644.
Working Papers:
1. "Talent Poaching and Job Rotation," with Diego Battiston and Miguel Espinosa, August 2023.
- Revise & Resubmit at the Management Science.
Abstract: The value of a firm's service lies both in its workers and its relationship with clients. In this paper, we study the interaction between client-specific experience accumulated by workers, poaching behaviour from clients and strategic rotation of workers by firms. Using detailed personnel data from a security-service firm, we show that an increase in client-specific experience increases both the productivity of workers and their probability of being poached. The firm reacts to this risk by rotating workers across multiple clients, and more frequently so to those workers more likely to be poached. We show that after a policy change that prohibited talent poaching, the firm sharply decreased the frequency of rotation which in turn increased workers' productivity. We propose a theoretical model that guides the empirical patterns and allows us to argue their external validity beyond our specific empirical setting.
2. "Startup Acquisitions: Acquihires and Talent Hoarding," with Jean-Michel Benkert and Igor Letina, October 2023.
Abstract: We study how competitive forces may drive firms to inefficiently acquire startup talent. In our model, two rival firms have the capacity to acquihire and integrate a startup operating in a possibly orthogonal market. We show that firms may pursue such "acquihires" as a preemptive strategy, even when these transactions appear unprofitable in isolation. Thus, acquihires, even absent traditional competition-reducing effects, need not be benign as they can lead to inefficient talent allocation. Additionally, our analysis underscores that such talent hoarding can diminish consumer surplus and exacerbate job volatility for acquihired employees.
3. "Image-Building Persuasion," with Carl Heese, October 2023.
Abstract: In many economic situations, a sender communicates strategically with a receiver not only to influence the latter's decision-making but also to influence how certain unobserved characteristics of herself (e.g. loyalty, integrity, or smartness) are perceived. To study such strategic interactions, we introduce image-building motives into the canonical framework of Bayesian persuasion. We characterize how the sender optimally sacrifices her persuasive influence on the receiver's decision to boost her reputation, by manipulating the communication protocol about a payoff-relevant state. Whether the receiver fares better or worse compared to the pure persuasion setting may depend on the selected equilibrium, and effects can be non-monotone with respect to the sender's characteristics. We illustrate our findings within various classic payoff environments, for instance with quadratic losses or state-independent sender preferences. Finally, we use the model to shed new light on a wider range of applications.
中文期刊发表 (Publications in Chinese):
1. "有限理性下的集体合作：理论与应用," 与胡涛合作, 《经济学 (季刊) 》，2023年第23卷第6期，2213-2230页。
2. "相关性误判与策略性信息混淆," 与沈吉、王禛阳合作, 《经济管理学刊》，录用待刊。
