Publications:
1. "Delegating Performance Evaluation," with Igor Letina and Nick Netzer, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
2. "Targeted Information and Limited Attention," with Andreas Hefti, RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
3. "Voting with Public Information," Games and Economic Behavior, 113, pp. 694-719, 2019.
4. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities,"
with Alexey Kushnir, Economic Theory, 67, pp. 617-644, 2019.
1. "Delegating Performance Evaluation," with Igor Letina and Nick Netzer, Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
2. "Targeted Information and Limited Attention," with Andreas Hefti, RAND Journal of Economics, forthcoming.
3. "Voting with Public Information," Games and Economic Behavior, 113, pp. 694-719, 2019.
4. "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation for Environments with Non-Linear Utilities,"
with Alexey Kushnir, Economic Theory, 67, pp. 617-644, 2019.
Working Papers:
1. "Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets," with Dimitri Migrow, September 2019.
Abstract: Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is complemented by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.
2. "Confusion and Competition," with Andreas Hefti and Armin Schmutzler, December 2019.
Abstract: Do firms seek to make a market transparent or do they want to manipulate the perception of product characteristics? Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, obfuscation is not necessarily an equilibrium phenomenon in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms seek to educate consumers. However, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion is beneficial for firms and obfuscation an equilibrium strategy. The adverse welfare consequences of obfuscation can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option or deny choice altogether. Our model can also be adapted to offer new insights on the incentives for political candidates to induce polarized opinions by confusing voters.
3. "Monotone Equilibria in Signalling Games," with Harry Di Pei, January 2020, R&R at European Economic Review.
Abstract: We examine the monotonicity of sender's equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signaling games. We show that when the sender's return from the receiver's action depends on her type, the Spence-Mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which a higher-type sender chooses a strictly lower action than a lower-type. We provide sufficient conditions under which all equilibria are monotone, which require the sender's payoff decreases in her action, increases in the receiver's action, and has strictly increasing differences between her type and the action profile. We apply our sufficient conditions to education signaling, advertising, and warranty provision.
4. "On Linear Transformations of Intersections," with Alexey Kushnir, September 2017.
Abstract: For any linear transformation and two convex closed sets, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when the transformation of the intersection of the sets coincides with the intersection of their images. We also identify analogous conditions for non-convex sets, general transformations, and multiple sets. We demonstrate the usefulness of our results via an application to the economics literature of mechanism design.
1. "Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets," with Dimitri Migrow, September 2019.
Abstract: Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is complemented by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.
2. "Confusion and Competition," with Andreas Hefti and Armin Schmutzler, December 2019.
Abstract: Do firms seek to make a market transparent or do they want to manipulate the perception of product characteristics? Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, obfuscation is not necessarily an equilibrium phenomenon in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms seek to educate consumers. However, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion is beneficial for firms and obfuscation an equilibrium strategy. The adverse welfare consequences of obfuscation can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option or deny choice altogether. Our model can also be adapted to offer new insights on the incentives for political candidates to induce polarized opinions by confusing voters.
3. "Monotone Equilibria in Signalling Games," with Harry Di Pei, January 2020, R&R at European Economic Review.
Abstract: We examine the monotonicity of sender's equilibrium strategy with respect to her type in signaling games. We show that when the sender's return from the receiver's action depends on her type, the Spence-Mirrlees condition cannot rule out equilibria in which a higher-type sender chooses a strictly lower action than a lower-type. We provide sufficient conditions under which all equilibria are monotone, which require the sender's payoff decreases in her action, increases in the receiver's action, and has strictly increasing differences between her type and the action profile. We apply our sufficient conditions to education signaling, advertising, and warranty provision.
4. "On Linear Transformations of Intersections," with Alexey Kushnir, September 2017.
Abstract: For any linear transformation and two convex closed sets, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for when the transformation of the intersection of the sets coincides with the intersection of their images. We also identify analogous conditions for non-convex sets, general transformations, and multiple sets. We demonstrate the usefulness of our results via an application to the economics literature of mechanism design.
Research Notes:
1. "A Note on Jackson and Yariv (2017)," October 2017.
Abstract: In this short note, I provide a generalization of the main results of Jackson and Yariv (2017) on the (non-)existence of representative agents.
2. "A Note on Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (2009)," with Alexey Kushnir, April 2014.
Abstract: Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (2009) provide two simplified and insightful proofs for the celebrated Roberts' Theorem (Roberts, 1979). In this short note, we correct a mistake in their first proof.
1. "A Note on Jackson and Yariv (2017)," October 2017.
Abstract: In this short note, I provide a generalization of the main results of Jackson and Yariv (2017) on the (non-)existence of representative agents.
2. "A Note on Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (2009)," with Alexey Kushnir, April 2014.
Abstract: Lavi, Mu'alem and Nisan (2009) provide two simplified and insightful proofs for the celebrated Roberts' Theorem (Roberts, 1979). In this short note, we correct a mistake in their first proof.
