Working Papers:
1. "Time is Knowledge: What Response Times Reveal," with Jean-Michel Benkert and Nick Netzer, June 2026.
Abstract: Response times contain information about economically relevant but unobserved variables like willingness to pay, preference intensity, quality, or happiness. We provide a general characterization of the properties of latent variables that can be detected using response time data. Our theoretical framework unifies and generalizes existing results in the literature and gives rise to many new applications. We illustrate the novel insights that the method can deliver through three empirical applications: identifying an optimal nudge, testing decreasing marginal happiness of income, and predicting treatment heterogeneity.
2. "Persuasion versus Presentation," with Carl Heese, December 2023.
Abstract: In many economic situations, people communicate strategically not only to influence the decision-making of their audience but also to shape the perception of certain unobserved characteristics of themselves (e.g. morality, loyalty, or capability). To study such situations, we propose a model of Bayesian persuasion in which a sender endowed with a private type designs the communication about a payoff-relevant state to a receiver. The sender, concerned with both the impacts on the receiver's action and how her type is perceived, aims to strike a balance between persuasion and self-presentation under optimal communication. Whether the receiver fares better or worse compared to the pure persuasion setting may depend on the selected equilibrium, and the welfare effects can be non-monotone with respect to the relative strength of the sender's different motives. We illustrate our findings within various classic payoff environments, for instance with quadratic losses or state-independent sender preferences. Finally, we use the model to shed new light on a wide range of applications.
3. "Managerial Allocation Skill and the Value of Digital Monitoring," with Yuyu Chen, Miguel Espinosa, and Jingchen Zhu, July 2026.
Abstract: Digital monitoring gives managers richer information, but its value depends on how managers deploy human capital. Using the staggered rollout of a tracking system in a large manufacturer, we show that monitoring raises total output by expanding span of control but does not improve average worker productivity. Productivity gains appear in teams lead by managers with stronger task-allocation skill, who use the new information to deploy and retain high-performing workers more effectively. Monitoring therefore increases the returns to managerial resource-orchestration capability rather than substituting for it.
中文工作论文：
1. 隐私增强技术的信息沟通能否缓解公众担忧？基于跨国调查实验的证据，
与高彧，雷莹，孟涓涓，翁翕，张若妍合作.
1. "Time is Knowledge: What Response Times Reveal," with Jean-Michel Benkert and Nick Netzer, June 2026.
Abstract: Response times contain information about economically relevant but unobserved variables like willingness to pay, preference intensity, quality, or happiness. We provide a general characterization of the properties of latent variables that can be detected using response time data. Our theoretical framework unifies and generalizes existing results in the literature and gives rise to many new applications. We illustrate the novel insights that the method can deliver through three empirical applications: identifying an optimal nudge, testing decreasing marginal happiness of income, and predicting treatment heterogeneity.
2. "Persuasion versus Presentation," with Carl Heese, December 2023.
Abstract: In many economic situations, people communicate strategically not only to influence the decision-making of their audience but also to shape the perception of certain unobserved characteristics of themselves (e.g. morality, loyalty, or capability). To study such situations, we propose a model of Bayesian persuasion in which a sender endowed with a private type designs the communication about a payoff-relevant state to a receiver. The sender, concerned with both the impacts on the receiver's action and how her type is perceived, aims to strike a balance between persuasion and self-presentation under optimal communication. Whether the receiver fares better or worse compared to the pure persuasion setting may depend on the selected equilibrium, and the welfare effects can be non-monotone with respect to the relative strength of the sender's different motives. We illustrate our findings within various classic payoff environments, for instance with quadratic losses or state-independent sender preferences. Finally, we use the model to shed new light on a wide range of applications.
3. "Managerial Allocation Skill and the Value of Digital Monitoring," with Yuyu Chen, Miguel Espinosa, and Jingchen Zhu, July 2026.
Abstract: Digital monitoring gives managers richer information, but its value depends on how managers deploy human capital. Using the staggered rollout of a tracking system in a large manufacturer, we show that monitoring raises total output by expanding span of control but does not improve average worker productivity. Productivity gains appear in teams lead by managers with stronger task-allocation skill, who use the new information to deploy and retain high-performing workers more effectively. Monitoring therefore increases the returns to managerial resource-orchestration capability rather than substituting for it.
中文工作论文：
1. 隐私增强技术的信息沟通能否缓解公众担忧？基于跨国调查实验的证据，
与高彧，雷莹，孟涓涓，翁翕，张若妍合作.
